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David Armstrong accepted the following three theses: universals are immanent;
laws are relations between universals; laws govern. Taken together, they form
an attractive position, for they promise to explain regularities in nature—one
of the most important desiderata for a theory of laws and properties—while
remaining compatible with naturalism. However, I argue that the three theses
are incompatible. The basic idea is that each thesis makes an explanatory
claim, but the three claims can be shown to run in a problematic circle. I then
consider which thesis we ought to reject (hint: see the title), and suggest some
general lessons for the metaphysics of laws.
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1 Introduction
Metaphysical theories of laws and properties are often packaged together. In this
paper, I’ll provide an objection to David Armstrong’s (1978a; 1978b; 1983; 1997)
combined theory of laws and properties. My objection is based on three central
components of his metaphysics:
(A) Universals are immanent.
(B) Laws are second-order external relations between universals.
(C) Laws govern particular matters of fact, and are thus responsible for natural
regularities.
Each thesis can be interpreted as making a claim involving a kind of metaphysically
explanatory relation I’ll call ontological priority. In Section 2, I’ll discuss ontological
priority. In Section 3, I’ll explain and motivate my interpretation of Armstrong’s
theses. In Section 4, I’ll argue that, so interpreted, they are jointly incompatible.1
And in Section 5, I’ll reflect on which thesis we should reject. Two takeaways
are especially interesting. First, Armstrong’s theory of laws requires transcendent
universals. As a result, any argument in favor of the view that laws are relations
∗Forthcoming in Canadian Journal of Philosophy. This is the penultimate draft.
1I’m not the first to notice that immanent universals may be in tension with other components
of Armstrong’s metaphysics. See, for example, Bolender (2006), Mumford (2004, 101–103), Rives
(2014), Bennett (2017, 14), Barnes (2018, 3.1), and Raven (Manuscript). I’ll discuss important
differences between their arguments and mine in the Appendix.
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between universals is also an argument in favor of transcendent universals; and any
objection to transcendent universals is an objection to the theory of laws. Second,
all theories capable of explaining regularities seem to be incompatible with the spirit
of Armstrong’s Naturalism, according to which everything that exists is or is a part
of our spatiotemporal world (Armstrong 1997, 5–6, 41).
2 Ontological priority
Any systematic metaphysics should allow for a creation story that describes the
explanatory order in which entities in the ontology come to be. When we claim
that some things exist because other things exist, or that some things exist in virtue
of the existence of others, we contribute to such a story. Here are some examples
of claims that invoke this sort of explanatory order: ‘{Socrates} exists because
Socrates exists’; ‘my Lego airplane exists because it is composed of bricks suitably
configured’; ‘contingent beings exist because a necessary being exists’; etc.2 A
necessary condition for such explanations is that the entities doing the explaining
exist prior to the entities being explained. Thus, I’ll call the relation central to
such a story ontological priority. I’ll stipulate that it forms a strict partial order : it
is transitive (because ordering explanations chain), asymmetric (because we don’t
like explanatory circles in ordering explanations), and irreflexive (because nothing
explains itself). The point of the relation is to establish an order suitable for a
creation story. To adapt a popular metaphor (Schaffer 2009, 351), priority relations
specify the order in which God would have to create things to make a world like
ours. Without these formal features, the relation would have a hard time playing
that role.3
Readers may wonder why I’ve labeled this relation ‘ontological priority’ instead
of ‘ground’. Though I don’t have any major objection to casting my argument
in terms of ground, doing so might make one of my premises appear to be more
contentious than it really is. In 3.3, I’ll argue that governing laws are prior to
the regularities they bring about. However, the relation between governing law
and regularity (call it governance) has some features that distinguish it from more
commonly discussed cases of ground, and for that reason my argument may not
suffice to show that governing laws ground regularities. Thus, I want to allow that
ground and governance could be distinct relations. Nevertheless, I think they play
the same role in establishing an order for a creation story, which is to say that they
make the same contribution to matters of ontological priority. I’ll say more about
this in 3.3 after I’ve explained how I understand governance (and I’ll revisit the
2The literature on metaphysically explanatory relations is vast. See, for example, Lowe (1998)
on asymmetric dependence, Fine (2001), Schaffer (2009), and Rosen (2010) on ground, and Wil-
son (2014), Koslicki (2015), and Bennett (2017) for defences of pluralism about metaphysically
explanatory relations. For introductory surveys, see Koslicki (2013) and Raven (2015).
3See Raven (2013) and Raven (2015, 6.2) for discussions of why metaphysically explanatory
relations—and in particular, the relation of ground—have such properties. For dissent, see Jenkins
(2011), Schaffer (2012), and Rodriguez-Pereyra (2015). It’s worth noting that those who doubt that
certain metaphysically explanatory relations have these formal properties might nevertheless agree
that ontological priority—as the central relation in a metaphysical creation story—does have them.
For example, Barnes (2018) argues that dependence isn’t asymmetric, but suggests that ordering
relations like relative fundamentality are. In any case, I’ll consider the objection that ontological
priority lacks these features in 4.4.
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issue in 4.4., where I consider a related objection).
3 Armstrong’s theories of laws and properties
3.1 Universals are immanent.
I take the distinction between immanent and transcendent universals to be captured
by the following theses:
Immanence: States of affairs—that is, instances of universals—are prior to univer-
sals.
Transcendence: Universals are prior to states of affairs.
Proponents of Immanence and proponents of Transcendence need not disagree about
what exists. They can accept all the same states of affairs, universals, and so on.
Their disagreement is over which comes first. Ontological priority is an appropriate
explanatory relation for expressing these views because its formal features respect
our general principles of ordering. For example, Immanence and Transcendence are
supposed to be incompatible, but they would be compatible if we allowed symmetric
relations of priority.
It’s worth discussing the relationship between Immanence, Transcendence, and
a third principle that Armstrong endorses:
The Principle of Instantiation: There are no uninstantiated universals.
Immanence entails the Principle of Instantiation, so it’s natural to associate these
theses with one another. However, the Principle of Instantiation is compatible
with Transcendence as well, since it is possible for there to be worlds in which all
transcendent universals are instantiated. Although Armstrong usually describes his
view in terms of the Principle of Instantiation, he clearly accepts Immanence as well
(see Armstrong (1983, 165), (1989, 82), and (1997, 29, 118)).
Why does Armstrong accept Immanence? There are two main reasons. First,
Transcendence is incompatible with Armstrong’s Naturalism (Armstrong 1997, 5–6,
41). Transcendent universals exist (or are at least capable of existing) independently
of their instances. This seems to put them in ‘Platonic heaven’ (Armstrong 1989, 76).
Second, Armstrong believes that because transcendent universals are separable from
states of affairs, Transcendence is especially susceptible to Bradley-inspired relation
regresses (see, for example, Armstrong (1978a, 70) and Armstrong (1989, 108–110)).
For myself, I don’t find either of Armstrong’s reasons to be very compelling, but
more on that in the last section of the paper.
3.2 Laws are second-order relations between universals.
According to Armstrong (1983), laws of nature are higher-order states of affairs.
They consist of a nomic relation holding between first-order universals, having a
form such as N(F,G)—where N is the nomic relation binding first-order universals
F and G. Nomic relations (like N) have four crucial features. First, they are second-
order : their relata are universals, not particulars. Second, they are external : they
do not hold solely in virtue of (the natures of) their relata. Third, they are modally
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laden. For example, it is a necessary truth that if two universals stand in the
relation of nomic necessitation then there is a corresponding regularity among their
instances.4 Finally, they are irreducible: this is to say that whether a nomic relation
binds two universals cannot be reduced to (does not supervene on, is not grounded
in) other features of the world, including natural regularities. Since this theory of
laws was proposed independently by Dretske (1977), Tooley (1977), and Armstrong
(1983), I’ll call it the DTA Theory of Laws (or DTA for short). Using this label
allows us to avoid an ambiguity in ‘Armstrong’s theory of laws’. This expression can
refer to DTA in general, or it can refer to Armstrong’s specific development of DTA
that incorporates a great many additional theses: for example, his claims about the
modal strength of laws, his account of functional laws, his account of probabilistic
laws, his solution to van Fraassen’s (1989) inference problem, etc. My argument
appeals to DTA in general, not to Armstrong’s specific version. In 4.3, I’ll argue
that DTA should be understood to involve the claim that universals are prior to
laws, but that argument will be easier to make with more background in place.
DTA is supposed to have a number of advantages (Armstrong 1983, 99–107).
I’ll mention just a few. First, it nicely distinguishes between lawlike and accidental
regularities, since the former are, whereas the latter are not, supported by nomic re-
lations between universals. Second, DTA laws support counterfactuals. Third, DTA
laws support induction, or at least help to make sense of the rationality of induction.
Fourth, DTA laws can explain their instances, thereby providing an explanation of
regularities in nature. All of these purported advantages are contentious, but my
goal here is not to defend them. I just want to point out that they are impor-
tant for motivating DTA. The fourth putative advantage is especially important,
because the second and third seem to depend on it. If laws can’t explain their ob-
served instances then it’s hard to see how they could imply anything about their
unobserved instances (as they’d have to do to support induction) or facts in other
possible worlds (as they’d have to do to support counterfactuals). Another reason
is that the explanatory power of DTA laws is what makes them epistemically acces-
sible (Armstrong 1983, 104). They are theoretical entities, so if they can’t explain,
we can’t arrive at knowledge of them by way of an explanatory inference. What
gives DTA laws these advantages? In short, their modal attributes make them gov-
erning as opposed to merely descriptive. Let’s turn to this feature of Armstrong’s
metaphysics.
3.3 Laws govern.
How should we understand Armstrong’s claim that DTA laws govern particular mat-
ters of fact (Armstrong 1983, 106)? Instead of starting with Armstrong, I’d like to
review some more recent attempts to describe governance. Beebee (2000, 578–579)
characterizes DTA laws as ‘governing’ and ‘grounding’ regularities, as ‘making’ the
future turn out the way it does (in contrast to Humean laws which don’t ‘do’ any-
thing, but merely describe), and as being ‘already present’ before future regularities
obtain. Tim Maudlin, a proponent of primitive governing laws, describes his laws
as follows:
4Some nomic relations (such as irreducibly probabilistic nomic relations) may not bring about
their corresponding regularities with necessity. However, they still involve a kind of modal force
capable of explaining regularities and supporting counterfactuals.
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The universe started out in some particular initial state. The laws of
temporal evolution operate, whether deterministically or stochastically,
from that initial state to generate or produce later states. And the sum
total of all the states so produced is the Humean mosaic. (Maudlin 2007,
174)
Heather Demarest says that non-Humean entities such as governing laws or powers
possess a kind of metaphysical ‘oomph’ or ‘power’ that is ‘best thought of as a
dynamic, metaphysical dependence’ (2017, Section 2.4). Nina Emery (2019) argues
that non-Humean laws ground their instances. On any of these characterizations of
governance, it’s reasonable to conclude that governing laws are ontologically prior
to the particular matters of fact they govern.
Returning to Armstrong, we find that he uses similar language to explain what
his nomic relations between universals do (see (Armstrong 1983, 86–106)). For ex-
ample, he says that laws entail regularities without being dependent on them (Arm-
strong 1983, 85–88), and at least expresses some sympathy towards the suggestion
that laws actively produce the regularities: ‘we will have to say that the entailment
holds in virtue of a de re necessity linking the relation between the universals, on
the one hand, and the uniformity it “produces”, on the other’ (86). Consider also
his elucidation of the connection between law and regularity—i.e., his attempt to
clarify the nature of the relation of nomic necessitation—by considering its role in
causal interactions:
We may perhaps render ‘N(F,G)’, the assertion of a state of affairs which
is simultaneously a relation, in words as follows:
Something’s being F necessitates that same something’s being
G, in virtue of the universals F and G.
This is not to be taken simply as:
For all x, x being F necessitates that x is G.
because this would be to fall back, once again, into a form of the Regu-
larity theory. Instead, as the phrase ‘in virtue of the universals F and G’
is supposed to indicate, what is involved is a real, irreducible, relation,
a particular species of the necessitation relation, holding between the
universals F and G (being an F, being a G). (Armstrong 1983, 96–97)
Because DTA laws are atomic states of affairs that cannot be analyzed in terms
of natural regularities, and because they are nonetheless supposed to bring about
regularities with modal force, it seems very natural to interpret the claim that laws
govern as involving a claim about ontological priority: our world contains governing
laws of nature, and it is in virtue of these governing laws that regularities obtain;
in other words, the states of affairs constituting regularities exist because governing
laws exist.
Indeed, something like this robust notion of governance seems required if DTA
laws are to have the advantages discussed at the end of the subsection above (ex-
planatory power, etc.). It will be helpful to contrast the kind of explanation available
to proponents of governing laws with the sort of explanation available to those who
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reduce laws to regularities in a Humean mosaic (Lewis 1973, 1983; Loewer 1996;
Beebee 2000; Schaffer 2008). In a continuation of the quote above, here’s what
Maudlin says about explanations involving governing laws:
This counts as an explanation exactly because the explanans (namely the
initial state, or the state up to some time, and the laws) are ontologically
distinct from the explanandum (namely the rest of the Mosaic). The
laws can operate to produce the rest of the Mosaic exactly because their
existence does not ontologically depend on the Mosaic. If it did (as the
Humean would have it) then they could not play this sort of role in
producing the Mosaic, and hence could not play any role in this sort of
explanation of the Mosaic. (Maudlin 2007, 175)
Armstrong makes a similar claim:
. . . if all the observed Fs are Gs, then it seems to be an explanation of this
fact that it is a law that Fs are Gs. But, given the Regularity theory, the
explanatory element seems to vanish. For to say that all the observed
Fs are Gs because all the Fs are Gs involves explaining the observations
in terms of themselves.5
Both Maudlin and Armstrong claim that there is an important sense in which gov-
erning laws do, but Humean laws do not, explain. This is compatible with allowing
that Humean laws can explain in some less metaphysically robust sense—say, by
supporting deductive-nomological explanations in which statements of laws feature
merely as general premises in deductive arguments (Hempel 1965). The sense in
which governing laws explain is more robust. Instances of a law N(F,G) fall un-
der the law because they acquire G via the operation of the law. This contrast
strengthens the case that DTA laws are ontologically prior to their instances.6 The
kind of explanation in question is a robust metaphysical explanation with the same
formal features as the relation of ontological priority. Thus, the putative advan-
tages of DTA laws discussed above are closely intertwined with the fact that they
govern—and thus with ontological priority—since that is required to make sense of
their distinctive explanatory power.
I can now elaborate on my reasons for labeling the relation central to a meta-
physical creation story ‘ontological priority’ instead of ‘ground’. The way a law
governs its instances seems different from the way in which, say, parts compose a
whole, Socrates grounds his singleton, and similarly for other paradigm instances of
ground. It is usually held that grounding relations necessitate: if x grounds y, then
it is necessary that if x then y. However, if we accept the possibility of irreducibly
probabilistic governing laws, it’s not necessary that all laws give rise to their cor-
responding regularities. Moreover, there’s a controversy about the modal strength
of deterministic laws of nature. For example, Wilsch (2018, section 4) argues that
the necessity with which a governing law brings about its instances is weaker than
5For related arguments, see Maudlin (2007, 172), Foster (1982-1983), Fales (1990, Chapter 4),
and Hildebrand (2013a).
6In drawing this contrast, I simply wish to highlight the distinctive character of explanation
involved in governance. I take no stand on the issue of whether Humean accounts are susceptible
to a kind of explanatory circularity. For recent discussion, see Loewer (2012), Lange (2013), Hicks
and van Elswyk (2015), Miller (2015), Lange (2018), Emery (2019), and Shumener (Forthcoming).
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metaphysical necessity: it has its own unique nomological character, determined
by its unique essence. Finally, ground is sometimes described as a relation of con-
stitutive explanation, but there is no reasonable sense in which a governing law is
constitutive of regularities.
Thus, as Emery (2019, section 7) mentions, we have an interpretive option.
We can adopt an expansive conception of ground that includes governance as a
species; or we can treat governance as a sui generis explanatory relation distinct
from ground.7 It’s not necessary to settle this matter here. If governance is a species
of ground, my claims about ontological priority can be recast as grounding claims. If
ground and governance are distinct, my argument in the next section won’t generate
a circle of grounding relations. Nevertheless, I think that ground and governance
play essentially the same role in ordering a creation story, even if we take them to
be distinct metaphysical relations. To ground laws in regularities (fully or partially)
is to give a reductive account of laws; regularities have to exist already in order to
ground laws, which means that if they were to exist already then there’d be nothing
left for governing laws to do. To produce regularities, governing laws must exist in
advance, so to speak; they can’t be grounded by the very things they are responsible
for bringing into existence. Therefore, even if governance is distinct from ground,
the two relations play the same ordering role. Grounds are prior to the grounded;
that which governs is prior to that which is governed.
4 The incompatibility of Armstrong’s three theses
I’ll now argue that Armstrong’s three theses are incompatible because they form an
unacceptable circle of ontological priority relations.
4.1 Stage 1: Setup
We begin with two premises established in the section above:
(1) States of affairs are prior to universals.8
(2) Laws are prior to regularities.
Premise (1) is a restatement of Immanence. Premise (2) follows from my interpre-
tation of Armstrong’s claim that laws govern particular matters of fact, and thus
explain regularities. Recall that when a relation of priority holds between two things,
the existence of one explains (or helps to explain) the existence of the other. Thus,
(1) says that the existence of first-order states of affairs is prior to (explains) which
universals exist. And (2) says that the existence of the laws is prior to (explains)
which regularities there are. These premises are illustrated in Figure 1, in which
arrows represent relations of priority.
To derive a circularity, we need to spell out the relationships between states of
affairs and regularities, and between universals and laws. The circularity will entail
a contradiction, given the formal features of priority relations.
7Emery (2019) prefers the former; Wilsch (Manuscript) prefers the latter, and I suspect that
pluralists such as Wilson (2014) would as well.
8Strictly speaking, I should say that states of affairs of order n are prior to universals of order
n, but more on this later.
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Figure 1
4.2 Stage 2: States of affairs and regularities
Let’s now consider the relationship between natural regularities and the states of
affairs from which first-order universals are abstracted. A regularity is a pattern
that holds among states of affairs. Thus, the regularities governed by laws are
a subset of the first-order states of affairs that metaphysically explain which first-
order universals there are. In other words, there is a relationship of (at least) partial
identity between (i) the states of affairs that determine which first-order universals
there are and (ii) regularities governed by laws. (This relationship is represented in
Figure 2 by the ‘=p’ symbol.) This is almost the conclusion we want, but not quite.
Sometimes the existence of an entity or state of affairs is metaphysically ex-
plained by a multiplicity of other entities and/or states of affairs. Suppose that the
parts are prior to the whole. Arguably, the parts must be suitably configured; their
mere existence is insufficient for constitution. But although the parts do not suffice
to explain the whole, they seem to be prior to the whole without qualification. We
do not need to introduce a new relation of partial ontological priority to account
for the priority relation between parts and whole.9 Here is an application of analo-
gous reasoning in the case of laws. Suppose that the first-order states of affairs at
the present moment are determined by initial conditions and governing laws. The
laws partially explain the present, but they are insufficient to explain the present
on their own. Nevertheless, the laws are prior to the present without qualification.
The principle that partial explanation (of the relevant metaphysical sort) requires
unqualified priority allows us to infer the conclusion we want from the fact that
regularities and states of affairs are partially identical:
(3) Laws are prior to states of affairs.
More carefully, (3) says that the existence of the laws is prior to (helps explain)
which first-order states of affairs exist. This is represented in Figure 2. This is
not to say that every state of affairs requires a law to explain its existence, but
9In distinguishing an explanatory relation sufficient to bring about the existence of something
from one that is merely necessary, we arrive at a distinction similar to Fine’s (2012) distinction
between full and partial ground. In both cases, the ground (full or partial) is prior to the grounded
without qualification.
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that some do. Another way to express the thesis is to say that laws are prior to
the states of affairs they govern. My argument merely requires that some states of
affairs types have instances in virtue of governing laws, and it is plausible that this
could be the case. For example, many presently instantiated fundamental properties
may have had no instances in the early moments after the big bang. (I’ll consider
the objection that laws aren’t prior to all instances of states of affairs in 4.5.)
Figure 2
4.3 Stage 3: Universals and laws
We’re now in the position to consider the relationship between universals and laws.
For any two entities x and y, either x and y stand in no priority relation to one
another, x is prior to y, or y is prior to x.
Could universals and laws stand in no priority relation to one another? There
are two reasons to think that the answer is ‘No.’ First, this seems incompatible
with Armstrong’s theory of laws, since laws are states of affairs with universals as
constituents. If one has the other as constituent, surely there is some relation of
priority between them. Second, this relationship leads to a contradiction. Consider
Figure 3, in which the ‘–’ symbol indicates no relationship of priority. From the fact
that laws are prior to states of affairs and states of affairs are prior to universals,
by transitivity it follows that laws are prior to universals. But if laws are prior to
universals then it can’t be the case that there is no priority relation between them.
Could laws be prior to universals? This relationship is expressed in Figure 4.
(Note: Figures 4, 5, and 6 include a dashed arrow; this expresses the same relation
of ontological priority as a solid arrow, and is merely for the purpose of emphasizing
key differences between the figures.) The natural way to interpret Figure 4 is as
follows. We start with Laws. They’re fundamental. Universals are abstracted from
laws by way of states of affairs. Unfortunately, this story doesn’t fit nicely with
Naturalism (and therefore with one of the main motivations of Immanence). Laws,
being more fundamental than anything else in the diagram, seem to be in Platonic
heaven. And since laws are relations between universals, the universals would seem




with Armstrong’s theory of laws, for reasons I discuss in the next paragraph.10
We arrive at the final, and most natural alternative, expressed by Figure 5: first-
order universals are prior to DTA laws. Recall that DTA laws are states of affairs
in which external relations bind first-order universals. But notice that first-order
universals don’t determine which laws there are. In fact, it seems perfectly possible
to have a world of Armstrong’s first-order states of affairs without any laws of nature
at all. Just imagine a chaotic world of states of affairs but no lawlike regularities.
Thus, it’s possible to have first-order universals without laws (Armstrong 1997, 196–
197). However, it’s not possible to have DTA laws without first-order universals.
Given these facts, we should treat first-order universals as being prior to laws.11
10Also, a puzzle arises concerning the relationship between universals that feature in laws and
those that feature in first-order states of affairs. Consider first-order state of affairs Fa, and the law
N(F,G). F-ness the first-order universal is abstracted from Fa as a universal, but from N(F,G) as
a particular. What makes the F-ness in these two states of affairs the same? Without an answer,
it’s hard to see how laws explain their instances. See Rives (2014, 502ff) for relevant discussion.
11Objection: Laws are states of affairs, so by Immanence they’re prior to universals! Reply: The
objection is based on a failure to understand Immanence. We must qualify the claim that states of
affairs are prior to universals so that it says that states of affairs of order n are prior to universals
of order n. So interpreted, Immanence is compatible with the claim that first-order universals are
10
Thus,
(4) Universals are prior to laws.
More carefully, (4) says that the existence of first-order universals is prior to (helps
explain) the existence of laws (i.e., which laws there are). This relationship fits
naturally with DTA laws, whereas the other two possible relationships do not.
Figure 5
The claim that universals are prior to laws is compatible with Immanence. It’s
also compatible with the claim that laws govern (and explain regularities). However,
it is not compatible with both Immanence and the claim that laws govern, for the
diagram in Figure 5 contains a circle of priority relations. By Transitivity, every
element in the circle is prior to every element, violating Asymmetry and Irreflexivity.
Thus we have arrived at a contradiction.
4.4 Objections: Different formal features and different relations
In Section 2, I hinted at two potential strategies for responding to my argument:
first, deny that ontological priority forms a strict partial order; second, insist that
the relations in Armstrong’s circle are of different types. Let’s consider them in
turn.
In relaxing the formal features of ontological priority, we allow that circles in
a creation story needn’t be problematic as a general rule. Nevertheless, the harm-
lessness of some circles doesn’t imply the harmlessness of all circles, and I think
there’s a good case to be made that the particular circle formed by (1), (3), and
(4) is problematic.12 (The purpose of (2) is to establish (3), so we can ignore it.)
Consider the following questions and their answers, corresponding to the premises
in the argument above.
(1′) Why does our world contain the first-order universals it does? Because it
contains the first-order states of affairs it does.
prior to second-order states of affairs (that is, laws).
12It’s worth noting that the putative counterexamples to the strict partial ordering of ground
found in Jenkins (2011), Schaffer (2012), and Rodriguez-Pereyra (2015) involve cases that differ
significantly from claims (1), (3), and (4).
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(3′) Why does our world contain the states of affairs it does? Because (in part) it
contains the laws it does.
(4′) Why does our world contain the laws it does? Because (in part) it contains
the first-order universals it does.
In each case, we’re asking a question about the order of creation. Each thesis seems
to suggest a unique starting point, but not even God can uniquely start in all three
places at once. That would contradict the theses themselves.
Suppose we try to tell Armstrong’s creation story. God can’t create all the
first-order states of affairs first, because that contradicts the claim that laws govern.
God can’t create the first-order universals first, because that contradicts Immanence.
God can’t create the laws first, because that contradicts the claim that universals
are prior to laws (and it seems to make the laws Platonic). Intuitively, the circle
formed by claims (1), (3), and (4) is incoherent, even if relations of ontological
priority don’t form a strict partial order, generally speaking. Our theses themselves
imply asymmetry even if priority relations need not be asymmetric in general. And
our theses seem to form a chain, even if priority relations need not form chains in
general. This suggests that this particular circle is problematic, even if some circles
of priority relations are benign. I suppose that one could dig in one’s heels and
insist that the circle isn’t vicious, but I don’t understand how such a creation story
is supposed to go.
Considerations like these also lead me to think that it will not help to insist that
the relations in my circle are of different types. Suppose that, like me, one thinks
that (1) and (4) involve ground whereas (3) involves governance. But suppose
that, unlike me, one doesn’t think they are unified by a deeper ordering relation
of ontological priority. Once again, one could dig in one’s heels and insist that
my ‘circle’ is unproblematic, but I don’t understand how such a creation story is
supposed to go.
My responses may seem question-begging. Perhaps it is built into the very idea
of a ‘creation story’ as I understand it that there must be a single, objective relation
that forms a strict partial order. If that is so, we have at the very least learned
that there are serious limits to the kind of creation story available to Armstrong.
He would be committed to denying that ontological priority forms a strict partial
order.
4.5 Objection: Nothing new under the sun
Some might worry that the partial character of explanation involved in (3) and (4)
(and in (3′) and (4′)) allows for a creation story according to which God creates
some (but not all) first-order states of affairs first, followed by universals and then
by DTA laws, which then dynamically bring about the rest of the first-order states
of affairs.
Suppose a Laplacian worldview, according to which the laws operate on a set
of initial conditions to determine the subsequent course of history. On this picture,
it seems possible that governing laws are not prior to the initial conditions, even
though they are prior to the subsequent first-order states of affairs brought about by
their operation. Why? Consider Nothing New Worlds, in which every fundamental
property has instances in the initial conditions, so that no previously uninstantiated
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properties are ever instantiated at later times. The possibility of Nothing New
Worlds suggests that a crucial step of my argument has been overstated. In these
worlds, although the laws partially determine which first-order states of affairs there
are, the laws fail to be prior to all instances of every universal. This blocks the
circularity. In such worlds, the laws make no positive contribution to explaining
why we have the universals (state of affair types) we have, because they never bring
any new types of states of affairs into existence.
I don’t think that the possibility of Nothing New Worlds vindicates Armstrong’s
position. For starters, stipulating that all fundamental properties have instances in
the initial conditions seems ad hoc. I think Armstrong would have been uncom-
fortable with this, because he thought that there could be times at which certain
universals were uninstantiated (Armstrong 1983, 82). Relatedly, it seems possible
for there to be Something New Worlds, in which some universals are not instantiated
during the initial conditions but are instantiated later in virtue of the operation of
governing laws.
In fact, the possibility of Something New Worlds is much more significant than
the possibility of Nothing New Worlds. My arguments in Section 4 show that
Something New Worlds require transcendent universals. Laws involving initially
uninstantiated universals are prior to their instances, and the universals involved in
such laws are prior to the laws. Thus, initially uninstantiated universals are prior
to their instances, making them transcendent. However, the possibility of Nothing
New Worlds does not entail the possibility of immanent universals, since Transcen-
dence is compatible with the Principle of Instantiation. Since it’s plausible that
universals are either essentially transcendent or essentially immanent (Armstrong
1983, 120–121), we’d have to deny the possibility of Something New Worlds to save
Immanence. For the objection under consideration to succeed, it would have to be
necessary that if there were DTA laws then all properties involved in fundamental
laws would be instantiated during the initial conditions of the world. That is intu-
itively implausible, and it imposes a strong constraint on the content of scientific
theorizing: namely, that the correct scientific theory must not involve fundamental
properties that are not instantiated in our world’s initial conditions. Neither I nor
Armstrong think that metaphysicians should be in the business of imposing such
constraints on the natural sciences.
Something New Worlds may sound familiar. Michael Tooley has appealed to
similar possibilities:
Suppose that materialism is false, and that there is, for example, a non-
physical property of being an experience of the red variety. Then consider
what our world would have been like if the earth had been slightly closer
to the sun, and if conditions in other parts of the universe had been
such that life evolved nowhere else. The universe would have contained
no sentient organism, and hence no experiences of the red variety. But
wouldn’t it have been true in that world that if the earth had been a
bit farther from the sun, life would have evolved, and there would have
been experiences of the red variety? (Tooley 1977, 685)
Tooley’s conclusion is that we ought to endorse the possibility of uninstantiated
laws, and along with it, the possibility of uninstantiated universals. Something New
Worlds are structurally similar to Tooley’s world, but there are some important
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differences that make their possibility much less controversial than the possibility
of Tooley’s world. First, Tooley’s world requires properties that are never instan-
tiated, whereas Something New Worlds merely require properties that are not ini-
tially instantiated. Second, Tooley’s world requires emergent universals, whereas
Something New Worlds don’t. Third, Armstrong’s (1983, Chapter 8) response to
Tooley’s argument doesn’t transfer. Armstrong denies that there are uninstantiated
laws in Tooley’s world, but Something New Worlds do not involve uninstantiated
laws. They merely require laws involving properties that are not initially instanti-
ated. Thus, denying uninstantiated laws does not help in the present context. For
these reasons, even if we grant the possibility of Nothing New Worlds, my argument
in Section 4 is crucial for revealing the depth of the problem in pairing Immanence
with DTA. Ultimately, our judgment of Armstrong’s combined theory may rest on
our intuitions about certain cases, but these seem significantly less controversial
than the cases already in the literature.
5 Implications of my argument
We’ve derived a contradiction from Armstrong’s three theses. Which one should we
reject? It depends on what we think about a number of other issues. I’ll give a
cursory sketch of where I think we’re led, but I must emphasize that I don’t have
the space here to do much more than merely gesture at the options available.
To begin, let’s consider the result of pairing DTA with Transcendence. Does this
theory allow for a coherent creation story? Figure 6 looks just like Figure 5, except
the priority relation between first-order universals and first-order states of affairs has
been reversed. We can tell a coherent creation story for a world with this structure:
Figure 6
God creates universals first, laws second, and initial conditions third. The universals
are required to make laws as well as initial conditions. The laws together with initial
conditions explain the subsequent course of history, including the regularities that
result. Universals explain similarity relations among states of affairs throughout the
history of the world. There is no contradiction in this story analogous to that found
in Armstrong’s combined theory of laws and properties.13 Immanence is required
13One might worry that the explanation of states of affairs is overdetermined, since there are
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to derive the contradiction identified in Section 4, and rejecting it yields a coherent
theory.
This is an interesting result. Any reasons to accept the DTA theory of laws
become reasons to accept Transcendence (provided that one’s reason isn’t DTA’s
supposed compatibility with Naturalism). Likewise, any reasons to reject Transcen-
dence become reasons to reject DTA. Recognizing the connection between DTA and
the theories of universals may put us in the position to make progress concerning
debates about both subjects. One in particular is worth highlighting. There is a
class of objections to transcendent universals based on the idea, roughly put, that
transcendent universals are far removed from us both metaphysically and epistemi-
cally.14 They’re causally inert, and disconnected from space and time. How, then,
can they play an important role in our metaphysics? How, even in principle, could
we learn anything about them? Well, if there are governing DTA laws, transcendent
universals are not entirely disconnected from us. Although they may not themselves
be causal, they do play an important role in governance, and thus in productive ex-
planations. It is widely recognized that universals are posited in order to play a
certain explanatory role: namely, to explain similarities and differences. But we
are now considering a different explanatory role: namely, to help explain (along
with nomic relations) regularities in nature. In expanding the explanatory role of
transcendent universals in this way, we may be better placed to account for our epis-
temic access to them.15 If this is right, there may be an argument for transcendent
universals that simultaneously undercuts some of the more influential objections to
transcendent universals.
Admittedly, this is all very speculative. I’m assuming that we might have good
reasons to accept the theory that laws are relations between universals, but I haven’t
provided any such reasons here. Nor have I said much at all about what an appro-
priate epistemology for laws and universals might look like. Furthermore, I’ve only
examined one potential connection, but there are others.16 Despite these limitations,
two paths leading to it. However, the dashed arrow linking universals to states of affairs explains
similarity relations among first-order states of affairs, whereas the sequence of solid arrows leading
from universals to states of affairs explain regularities (distribution patterns among first-order states
of affairs).
14There is a very large literature on objections of this kind. For a recent overview, see Cowling
(2017, Chapter 4).
15This fits nicely with the popular view that the metaphysics of laws and properties are a package
deal. See Hicks and Schaffer (2017) for critical discussion, and Hildebrand (2019) for a recent
attempt to articulate an epistemology for governing laws and natural properties based on their
explanatory role. Hildebrand assumes that some non-Humean theory of laws (such as DTA or
Dispositionalism) provides a better explanation of regularities than its Humean competitors. This
is controversial, but see Foster (1982-1983), Fales (1990, Chapter 4), Bird (2007, 86–90), and
Hildebrand (2013a) for defences.
16 I’d be remiss if I didn’t mention the following two problems for DTA. First, rejecting Immanence
might seem to make the theory more susceptible to Bradley-inspired relation regresses (Armstrong
1989, 108–110). My preferred response to relation regresses is insensitive to the distinction between
immanent and transcendent universals. In short, such regresses rest on an unreasonable demand
to avoid unanalyzed predication (Lewis 1983), which amounts to a refusal to allow a theorist to
axiomatize the ontological primitives involved in their theory (Schaffer 2016) or to incorporate ide-
ological primitives in their metaphysics (Cowling 2017, 125–127). Second, some have thought that
the Dretske/Tooley/Armstrong approach to laws is particularly susceptible to van Fraassen’s (1989)
inference problem, and Armstrong’s specific solution is connected to his acceptance of Immanence.
I’ll discuss this in the appendix.
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this brief discussion provides good reason to think that the connection between DTA
laws and transcendent universals is not merely of concern to Armstrong scholars. It
may have significant implications for other philosophical debates.
My discussion of the potential virtues of pairing DTA with Transcendence is
predicated on some controversial assumptions. If we reject these assumptions, an-
other response to the incompatibility of Armstrong’s three theses may be required.
Once again, we’ll arrive at an interesting result.
To begin, let’s consider the possibility of rejecting only the claim that laws
govern. On this option, we retain our commitment to both Immanence and DTA.
This would require us to reject the claim that laws explain in the robust sense
discussed in 3.3. As noted there and at the end of 3.2, that would undercut many
putative advantages of DTA while threatening to make DTA laws epistemically
inaccessible. I do not think that this will be an attractive option for anyone.
Let’s now consider the possibility of rejecting Armstrong’s theory of laws. If
Armstrong’s theory of laws is rejected in favor of a Humean theory, its explanatory
benefits are lost entirely, but it does allow us to preserve the spirit of Armstrong’s
Naturalism.17 However, those attracted to non-Humeanism because of its purported
explanatory benefits will probably want to look elsewhere. One non-Humean option
is to shift to dispositionalism (Ellis 2001; Mumford 2004; Bird 2007). However,
dispositionalists may be forced to accept Transcendence anyway, for independent
reasons (Tugby 2013), and dispositionalists may have to admit some DTA-type
nomic relations in order to explain all regularities that we might like to explain,
such as regularities involved in conservation laws (French 2014) or in the retention
of dispositions through time (Tugby 2017). Another option is to treat governing laws
as unanalyzable primitives in the manner of Carroll (1994) and Maudlin (2007). This
option appears to be incompatible with Naturalism, because primitive laws must be
independent of the spatiotemporal world in order to govern it.18 Governing laws
could be analyzed by appealing to God (Foster 2004; Swinburne 2006), but this
proposal is incompatible with Naturalism as well. I’m moving quickly here, but my
goal is modest. I’m not trying to provide reasons to prefer DTA to these competing
theories. I just want to motivate the claim that there is no obvious alternative
theory that promises a Naturalism-compatible explanation of regularities.
In sum, my argument has two interesting implications. First, in learning that
DTA requires transcendent universals, we uncover a deep and potentially promising
connection between two areas of philosophy. Arguments for DTA become arguments
for Transcendence; and objections to Transcendence become objections to DTA.
Second, we face something like the following choice. We can accept Naturalism and
pair it with a Humean theory of laws, or we can try to explain regularities in nature
by pumping up our ontology in ways incompatible with Naturalism. Armstrong
tried to carve out an intermediate space between these two options. I have argued
that there is no such space to be found.
17I’m using ‘Humean’ not to refer to Hume’s position, but to refer to the sort of reductionism
defended by Lewis (1973, 1983), Loewer (1996), Beebee (2000), and Schaffer (2008).
18Strictly speaking, primitive laws are compatible with Immanence, but one of the main reasons
for accepting Immanence is lost on this picture.
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6 Appendix: Earlier objections to Armstrong
I’ll now discuss two earlier attempts to identify a tension between Immanence and
other elements of Armstrong’s metaphysics and explain why mine is importantly
different.
6.1 Mumford and Bolender’s objection
David Lewis (1983, 366) claims not to understand the modal connection between
DTA laws and regularities. The general problem of giving an account of the modal
connection between law and regularity has become known as the inference prob-
lem, following Bas van Fraassen’s (1989) influential development. Armstrong adds
a controversial thesis to DTA (explained below) in an attempt to solve the infer-
ence problem. Mumford (2004, 101–103) and Bolender (2006) attempt to derive a
contradiction between Immanence, the claim that DTA laws govern, and this extra
thesis.19 However, I do not think that Armstrong’s controversial thesis is required
for a solution to the inference problem—neither Tooley (1977; 1987) nor Dretske
(1977) accept it. Thus, one possible response is simply to reject the controversial
thesis. As a result, Mumford and Bolender’s argument lacks the interesting impli-
cations of my argument. Let’s take a closer look.
Here is a brief summary of Armstrong’s solution (1983, 88–99; 1997, 226–230).
The second-order state of affairs N(F,G) is not merely a higher-order state of affairs.
It is simultaneously a first-order structural universal whose instances are complex
states of affairs like a’s being F causes a’s being G. N(F,G), understood as a first-
order structural universal, is abstracted from complex causal states of affairs in the
same way that a simple universal F is abstracted out of particular instances of F.
The dual nature of the law—as both higher-order state of affairs and as a complex
structural universal abstracted from a’s being F causes a’s being G—is supposed to
be helpful in solving the inference problem, because it allows Armstrong to claim
that the higher-order relation N is identical to the singular causal relation. Thus,
insofar as causation is familiar, N isn’t mysterious.
The dual nature of N(F,G) forms the basis of Mumford and Bolender’s objection.
Deriving a contradiction from that thesis, Immanence, and the claim that laws gov-
ern is straightforward. Because states of affairs are prior to universals, the complex
causal states of affairs from which N(F,G) is abstracted are prior to N(F,G). But
because N(F,G) is a governing law, it is prior to the causal states of affairs that are
its instances.
To respond to Mumford and Bolender’s objection, we needn’t reject Immanence,
DTA, or the claim that laws govern. We can simply reject Armstrong’s additional
thesis concerning the dual nature of N(F,G). This strategy is promising for two
reasons. First, I don’t think that Armstrong’s solution to the inference problem is
particularly satisfying. Second, I think that there is an alternative solution to the
problem. I’ll discuss these in turn.
I understand how positing a complex structural universal is relevant to making
sense of the idea that instances of a law have something in common with one another.
However, I don’t think identifying that structural universal with N(F,G) makes any
19Rives (2014) argues that Armstrong’s solution to the inference problem requires transcendent
universals; he relies on the same controversial premise as Mumford and Bolender’s argument.
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progress towards explaining the necessary connection between law and regularity.
I just don’t understand why some ‘new’ instance of F would have to be a G just
because existing Fs are causally related to existing Gs and N(F,G) is abstracted
from them. As a result, I don’t find Armstrong’s solution to the inference problem
to be illuminating.20
Even if I’m wrong about the intrinsic merits of Armstrong’s solution, I don’t
think that rejecting it is costly. There are alternative solutions available. I prefer
a solution most carefully developed by Jonathan Schaffer (2016), which mirrors my
preferred solution to Bradley’s relation regress (mentioned in footnote 16). The basic
idea is this. Everyone needs ontological primitives. But the fact that something is
a primitive element of our ontology does not mean that nothing can be said about
it. Whenever we posit a primitive, we need to say what makes the primitive entity
the entity that it is. We do this at least in part by specifying its relations to other
elements of our ontology. To do this is to axiomatize the primitive. So, for example,
suppose we stipulate that relation N is the irreducible second-order external relation
such that, necessarily, for all universals F and G, if N(F,G) then all Fs are Gs. That
is the axiomatization of N. If we then posit a higher-order state of affairs N(P,Q) in
a world, we can’t question whether all Ps are Qs in that world. The axiomatization
of N precludes the question from arising.21 If this is right, we have no need for
Armstrong’s controversial thesis concerning the dual nature of N(F,G).
6.2 Bennett, Barnes, and Raven’s objection
Bennett (2017, 14), Barnes (2018, 3.1), and Raven (Manuscript) attempt to iden-
tify a smaller explanatory circle that arises between Immanence and Armstrong’s
account of states of affairs, with no need to bring laws into the picture. They appeal
to various metaphysically explanatory relations (building, dependence, and ground,
respectively), but I’ll present the argument in terms of ontological priority.
Their basic worry is this. Armstrong seems to be committed to treating uni-
versals as prior to states of affairs, since they are constituents of states of affairs
that explain relations of similarity (and difference) among states of affairs. But
this is incompatible with Immanence, which says that states of affairs are prior to
universals.
I suspect that Armstrong would accept Immanence and deal with the conse-
quences. Here’s how Barnes characterizes the consequences of this strategy:
If this horn of the dilemma is embraced, then the metaphysic becomes
explanatorily impoverished. For example, we want to be able to say that
the states of affairs of Jane’s being human and Tom’s being human have
something in common. But if the ultimate explanatory bedrock is just
20For what it’s worth, I prefer a reductive account of the relevant structural universals. This is
at odds with the claim the structural universal is identified with N(F,G), since N(F,G) as governing
law is not supposed to be reducible. Readers familiar with Lewis’s (1986) objection to structural
universals will recognize that Armstrong’s identification seems to commit him to a ‘magical account’
of structural universals. Lewis finds these unintelligible as well, for reasons closely related to his
failure to understand N.
21Tooley (1987, 123ff, 77–91) is at least open to the idea of solving the inference problem by way
of axiomatization. See his discussion of the ‘indirect’ or ‘general’ approach to defining nomological
relations. See Sider (1992) and Hildebrand (2013b) for arguments that Tooley’s further ‘speculative
account’ fails, so that he must rely on something like the axiomatic account.
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the states of affairs, and not their constituents, then it’s hard to see how
we could explain this commonality. We want to be able to say that the
constituents of a state of affairs explain why that state of affairs is the
way it is. Jane’s being human is the state of affairs it is because of the
constituents Jane and being human, and it is more similar to Tom’s being
human than to Rex’s being a dog because of the constituents involved
in each state of affairs. (Barnes 2018, 57)
Here is a possible reply on behalf of Armstrong. Jane’s being Human and Tom’s
being Human have something in common because we can abstract the same univer-
sal, being Human, out of them. That’s what it is for states of affairs to resemble
one another. Armstrong is pretty explicit that fundamental states of affairs have
an internal structure, where the various components of this structure are their con-
stituents. (See, for example, his extended use of the ‘layercake’ versus ‘blob’ analogy
in Armstrong (1989).) But we need not equate having internal structure in terms of
various constituents with having constituents that are prior. Consider an analogy to
Schaffer’s (2010) priority monism according to which the whole is more fundamen-
tal than its parts. Each Armstrongian state of affairs might be like that. Indeed,
Raven’s version of the argument derives a contradiction by explicitly including a
constituency principle according to which constituents are prior to that which they
jointly compose. As he points out, Armstrong could reject the principle and accept
its intuitive costs.
For our purposes it doesn’t matter whether this reply to Armstrong is successful.
My interest is not in refuting the objections of Barnes, Bennett, and Raven, but
in exposing important differences between their objection and my objection. The
crucial difference is this: because it aims for a smaller explanatory circle, it requires
the additional constitutivity principle.22 Thus, although I have sympathies for their
argument, it proceeds differently from mine and is to be settled on different grounds.
Finally, I’ll note that the implications of my objection discussed in Section 5 remain
the same even if their objection is successful.
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